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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
RUTH ELIZABETH HOLT CRAVEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
KENNETH D. CRAVEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7446 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In his brief, appellant attacks the respondent's petition 
for modification. This he has set out in full at pages 2, 3, 
and 4 of his brief. He also attacks the adequacy of the 
evidence to support certain of the Findings of Fact, the 
Conclusions of Law, and the Order of Modification. He 
has set out the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
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Order of Modification in full on pages 4, 5, 6, and 7 of his 
,] 
brief. He has detail~d certain of the facts on pages 7, 8, 
9, and 10 of his brief. 
Respondent feels that it is necessary to detail the key 
facts for the court. Respondent contends these show con-
siderable changes in the circumstances governing the 
amount of support money to be allowed. According to 
Finding of Fact No. 11 in the Findings in the original ~~~ 
divorce matter herein, at the time the divorce was granted, r 
appellant was unemployed. Appellant claims that the rec-
ord (at Tr. 28, 29) shows that there is no change in circum-
stances between the time of the original divorce decree and 
the time of the trial of this matter. However, according to 
the respondent's testimony upon cross examination upon 
which appellant relies (i. e. at Tr. 28) respondent refused 
to admit that there was no change in the circumstances of 
appellant's employment between the time of the original 
decree and the date of the modification hearing. 
At the time of the divorce the appellant was still pay-
ing for his home (Tr. 86), whereas it is now paid for (Tr. 
85) . Furthermore the testimony shows that appellant's · 
elder son is now 21 years old (Tr. 82), whereas he had 
obviously been in his minority at time of the decree. 
The testimony as to the appellant's income during the 
7.8 month period preceeding the hearing on the petition for 
modification was not $212.50 per month as contended by 
the appellant, but was actually between $283.00 and $380.00 
per month. This appears, from an examination of respond· 
ent's Exhibit "A", which was appellant's checking account 
j. 
t 
I 
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... record, as explained by the cross examination of the appel-
lant (Tr. 81, 82, 83). 
It further appeared that,nothing had been withdrawn 
,_ from_appellant's savings account since May 28, 1948 (Tr. 
10) which would indicate the adequacy of appellant's in-
come for his own support since that date. 
In his statement of Facts, appellant claims that the 
child was not of school age at the time of the hearing, how-
ever, the testimony was that respondent expected to enter 
the child in .school in the near future (Tr. 22). When re-
sj,ondent's testimony as to what it cost her per month for 
the care of the child is added up, it appears she must spend 
approximately $86.74 a month for the care of the child (Tr. 
21 through 27), which is considerably more than she spent 
for the care of the child at the time of the original divorce 
decree, i.e. $25.00 per month (Tr. 17 and 40). A summary 
of her testimony on this point shows the following: 
Food and tending (Tr. 21) per month ...... $30.00 
Clothing (Tr. 21), last 6 months ... $93.65 
next 6 months . . . 84.60 
Minimum average per month .............. 14.10 
Medical and dental care ( Tr. 24) 
Past 6 months .. $146.00 
Average per month . . . . . . 24.33 
Insurance (Tr. 25) per month . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.40 
Toys (Tr. 26) per year, $80.00-per month . . 6.66 
Amusement (Tr. 27) per month . . . . . . . . . . . 5.00 
Haircuts and medicines (Tr. 27) . . . . . . . . . . 3.25 
Total ............................... $86.74 
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m The child was 15 months old and still a babe in arms 
w 
at the time of the divorce decree (Tr. 14, 16) but was 5 
years 8 months old at the time Trial Court entered its ' )t 
f! decision herein. 
Evidence that an inflation had occurred in the price 
of items needed for children was offered in detail by Mr. 
Taylor (Tr. 44, 45, and 46) and Mr. Pace (Tr. 37 through 
65). 
No proof was offered at any time tending in any way to 
show that appellant was unable to pay the increased award 
ordered by the trial court. 
'\ 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law anL; der 
of Modification have been set out in full by the a1 ilant 
on pages 4, 5, 6, 7, of his brief. These Findings wen 
supported by the evidence, and conclusions basr. upon 
them to the effect 'that an increase should be made· in the 
support money allowance, and the order based ther~on, are 
well supported by, and in complete harmony with, the law. 
ARGUMENT 
J 
li 
1. THE RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR MODI- ~ 
FICATION ALLEGED THREE IMPORTANT MATERI-
AL CHANGES IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING A 
MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE; NAMELY, THE 
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~ CHANGE IN AGE AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHILD, 
THE GENERAL INFLATION IN PRICES OF ITEMS 
NECESSARY FOR THE CHILD, AND LASTLY THE 
FACT THAT THE APPELLANT WAS EMPLOYED AT 
THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION. 
Respondent alleged (in Par. 5 of her Petition) that 
since the decree of divorce was issued, the child of the 
parties had grown from infancy (fifteen months) to the 
age of five years and four months, with the result that he 
required much more food, clothing and medical care; 
furthermc-woe, that since the date of the decree there had 
been a gr at increase in the price of food, clothing, housing 
accomm(uations and all other items necessary for the proper 
care ar. support of the infant; that in consequence, Re-
spon :now needs $50.00 per month to care for the child 
(P: 1 of Respondent's Petition). 
f· 
epondent further alleged (in Par. 4 of her Petition) 
that _ . ;)ellant is now gainfully employed, which contrasts 
with ~ . ,ging of fact number 11 of the original divorce pro-
ceedings. 
This question has been dealt with by the Court in num-
erous previous cases. The authority to modify a divorce 
decree is contained in Section 40-3-5 U. C. A. 1943 as fol-
lows: 
"Disposition of Property and Children. 
"When a decree of divorce is made the court 
may make such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance of the 
parties and children, as may be equitable; provided, 
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that if any of the children have attained the age of 
ten years and are of sound mind, such children shall 
have the privilege of selecting the parent to which '· 
they will attach themselves. Such spbsequent j:' 
changes or new orders may be made by the court :i 
with respect to the disposal of the children or the dis-
tribution of property as shall be reasonable and 
proper." 
The rule as to pleading has been stated as follows in 
Cody vs. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952: 
j.: 
"* * * where material new conditions have 
arisen after the decrees were made, which conditions 
were not, and could not have been, considered or 
passed on by the courts, then, upon proper applica- t: 
tion and proof, the courts may make 'subsequent 
changes or new orders' respecting the allowance of 
alimony or the distribution of property or the dis-
posal of children." 
And in Buzzo vs. Buzzo, 45 Utah 1621, 148 P. 362: 
"* * * under statutes like ours, the courts 
upon the application of either party have the power 
to change, modify, or revise such a decree, and when-
ever it is satisfactorily made to appear that the cir-
cumstances and conditions of the parties, or one of 
them*, have changed so that the amount originally 
allowed is no longer just or equitable, the court may 
modify the same." (*Italics ours.) 
Appellant contends that respondent's petition does not 
meet the requirements of this rule. He cites numerous cases 
in support of this contention. 
We contend that the cases denying modification are 
clearly distinguishable. 
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In Hamilton vs. Hamilton, 89 Utah 554, 58 P. (2d) 11, 
~~ the court denied modification because the petition had no 
~:~ other basis than that the husband had failed to make certain 
' specified payments under a property settlement agreement. 
e~ In Chaffee vs. Chaffee, 34 Utah 261, 225 P. 76, modifi-
cation was denied because the defendant had alleged as the 
only basis therefore, salary changes and health impairments 
which had occurred before the granting of the original de-
cree. 
In Rockwood vs. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457, 
~ modification was denied where the husband's only allega-
tion of change was that the wife had remarried. The court 
(_:: pointed out that this did not of itself shift the burden of 
support to the wife or new husband. 
In Gardner vs. Gardner, 111 Utah 286, 177 P. (2d) 743, 
modification was sought by the husband in relation to the 
custody. The District Court increased the support money. 
The Supreme Court reversed this, since there were no al-
legations at all in relation to the sufficiency of the original 
award. 
In Jones vs. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P. (2d) 222, a 
decree by the District Court was reversed where it was al-
leged that additional sums were needed for a child, and the 
District Court awarded an increase in alimony to the wife. 
In Barraclough vs. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 111 P. 
(2d) 792, modification was sought on the grounds that the 
stipulation of the petitioner as to alimony amount was based 
on duress. The Supreme Court pointed out there was no 
allegation of change here. 
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In Osmus vs. Osmus, 198 P. (2d) 233, modification 
was denied where all changes alleged had occurred before 
the granting of the original decree. · 
On the other hand, modification has been allowed in 
the following Utah cases: 
In Hampton vs. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P. (2d) 419, 
a very substantial change in income was involved and modi-
fication was allowed. 
In Hendricks vs. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P. (2d) 
277, the price of wheat, upon which defendant's income de-
pended, had fallen from $1.10 a bushel to $.26 a bushel and 
modification was allowed. 
In Carson vs. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 P. (2d) 894, it was 
alleged a serious impairment of defendant's health had oc-
curred since the granting of the original decree and that he 
needed funds for medical and surgical care, and hospitaliza-
tion, and that modification was essential. 
The case, almost entirely like the present case, is 
Sandall vs. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 Pac. 1093. 
In this case a final decr·ee of divorce was entered for 
the plaintiff (the wife) against the defendant on July 28, 
1910. The decree also awarded the plaintiff the custody of 
their minor child, at that time about two years of age. On 
September 26t 1919, the plaintiff filed her petition for a 
modification of the decree, in substance alleging the grant-
ing of the divorce and the award to plaintiff of custody of 
the child. The petition then alleged that the decree of di-
vorce was granted on the ground of failure of the defend· 
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::,:::_ ant to provide plaintiff and the child with the common 
necessaries of life, and also on the ground of defendant's 
drunkenness and profligacy. The petition then alleged that 
at the time of the hearing in the divorce proceedings, and 
for a long time prior thereto, the defendant had been ad-
dicted to the use of liquor to the extent that he could not, 
and did not, work sufficiently to provide plaintiff and her 
minor child with the common necessaries of life; that the 
reason she did not insist at the trial of the divorce proceed-
ings on an allowance for support and maintenance of the 
minor child was owing to defendant's habit and his lack of 
ability to occupy a position of responsibility. Plaintiff 
further alleged that owing to the growth of the child and 
the high cost of living and the increased cost of clothing, it 
had become practically impossible for the plaintiff to pro-
'"''- vide the child with the necessaries of life and that within 
.-. 
-· 
the last three or four years defendant had improved his 
habits to such an extent that he was now able to contribute 
to the support and maintenance of the child; that defendant 
was earning upwards of $200.00 a month and had inherited 
certain property which made it then possible for him to 
make a proper allowance for the child's support, and that 
$40.00 per month would be a reasonable sum for that pur-
pose. 
The relief sought was granted, and defendant appealed 
on the ground (among others) that the petition for modifi-
cation of the decree did not state facts sufficient to entitle 
the plaintiff to relief. The Court held that the petition did 
state grounds for relief. T~e Court stated at Page 156 : 
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"* * * It is sufficient to say the petition 
seems to state all the elements necessary to sustain 
the order of the Court. It refers to the divorce with-
out alimony and reasons therefor, it recites the 
changed condition of plaintiff and her child and also 
the changed condition of the defendant in respect to 
his ability to support the child." 
It thus appears that where circumstances similar to 
these alleged in respondent's petition have been dealt with 
by this court in the past modification has been granted. 
2. AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED AT THE 
TRIAL TO WARRANT THE COURT'S ORDER OF 
MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE: TO-WIT: THAT 
DUE TO THE INCREASE IN THE CHILD'S AGE AND 
ACTIVITIES, THE EXPENSE OF CARING FOR THE 
CHILD HAD GREATLY INCREASED; THAT THE 
CHILD WAS APPROACHING SCHOOL AGE, WHICH 
FURTHER INCREASED THE COST OF CARING FOR 
THE CHILD; THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GENERAL 
INFLATION OF THE PRICE OF GOODS USED IN THE 
CHILD'S CARE; AND THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
NOW EMPLOYED AND EARNING AN ADEQUATE 
WAGE TO ENABLE HIM TO PAY AN INCREASED 
SUPPORT ALLOWANCE. 
Appellant claims much forth~ testimony as to there-
spondent's earning power. The trial court chose to ignore 
this, ruling that it was irrelevant; that the duty to support 
the child rests on the husband. No evidence was offered 
to show that this duty had been lifted, nor that appellant 
was unable to pay the increased amount sought. 
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This court has indicated that a wife's earnings may 
not be considered in determining the amount of support 
money to be paid by a husband. In the case of Holbrook 
vs. Holbrook, 208 P. (2d) 1113, a decree of divorce was 
entered on May 11, 1948 awarding the plaintiff wife the 
custody of 4 minor children of the parties and directing the 
defendant to pay her $150.00 per month for the support of 
these four children. A cash settlement of approximately 
$10,000.00 was allowed the plaintiff for the purpose of 
purchasing a new home. She also was given a certain other 
cash and assets, but no alimony. 
On January 11, 1949 an Order to Show Cause was 
issued against Mr. Holbrook, and at this time he filed a 
petition for modification of decree. The testimony showed, 
among other things not pertinent to our question, that since 
the decree Mrs. Holbrook had acquired work which paid her 
approximately $175.00 per month. Upon the basis of this, 
the defendant founded his contention that circumstances 
had changed entitling him to a modification of the decree 
to $80.00 per month for the support of the children. 
The lower court stated it would not consider this fact 
and that it would limit its decision to a change in status 
of the defendant or of the children. The Supreme Court, 
affirming the lower court, stated as follows: (We quote 
from Page 1115 of 208 Pacific Second.) 
"We see nothing in these facts that would justi-
fy the court modifying the allotments to the four 
children. The $150.00 was for their support, not the 
support of the mother. Naturally the mother would 
have to support herself. This she proceeded to do. 
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It would seem strange to permit the husband and 
father to force her into such a situation, then to take 
advantage of it to escape his liabilities without show-
ing some change for the worse in his ability to meet 
his obligations." 
Appellant claims the proof fails to show a change in 
his ability to pay, or that he can pay the increase at all. 
However, Finding of Fact number 11, states that at the 
time the divorce was granted (April 16, 1945) defendant 
was unemployed. This was alleged in paragraph 11 of the 
Complaint. Defendant entered a voluntary appearance, 
waiver and consent in this matter. We submit that he can 
not now come in and say that he was employed at the time 
of the decree, for the matter is res judicata. We quote from 
30 A. J. (Judgments) Sec. 178 : 
"It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence 
that material facts or questions which were in issue 
in a former action, and were there admitted or 
judicially determined, are conclusively settled by a 
judgment rendered therein, and that such facts or 
questions become res judicata and may not again 
be litigated in a subsequent action between the 
parties." 
This principle is announced and supported in Smith vs. 
Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P. 653, (at pages 131, 132, and 133 
of 37 Utah). 
In 17 A. J. (Divorce and Separation) § 486, it is stated: 
"As between the parties to the proceedings a 
valid judgment or decree is conclusive of all charges 
set forth and of facts found, or which might have 
been found, and of defenses raised at the trial." 
(Citing cases.) 
1 
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Appellant claims that he earned about $1700.00 during 
the period from January 1, 1949 to August 25, 1949 (Tr. 
78.) In his brief he contends this shows a decreased ability 
to pay. However, on cross examination, during which time 
he was shown respondent's Exhibit "A", (Appellant's check-
ing account record) he admitted that he deposited all de-
posits shown during the 7.8 month period in question, ex-
cept $800.00 (Tr. 81, 82) which he claimed was deposited 
there by his twenty-one year old son. He further admitted 
that the deposits he m~de all came from his earnings (Tr. 
83). 
Exhibit "A" shows the following deposits: 
Jan. 19, 1949 ... __ . ___ .... __ ..... $1,000.00 
Mar. 1, 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500.00 
Mar. 2, 1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300.00 
Mar. 8, 1949.... 100.00 
Mar. 22, 1949. . . . . . . 150.00 
Apr. 1, 1949. . 175.00 
Apr. 22, 1949. 100.00 
May 23, 1949 . . . . . . . . . 150.00 
June 3, 1949 . . . . . . . . . 363.30 
Aug. 2, 1949. . . . . . . . . . 150.00 
Total .......... . . .... $2,988.30 
Even if appellant did not earn the $800.00 he claims 
his 21 year old son deposited in his account, he still has 
earned an average of $283.00 a month for the 7.8 month 
period in question. This shows his statement of earnings 
of "about $1700.00" for this period was untrue. 
After hearing this falsity the trial court would have 
been warranted in concluding that appellant was not telling 
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the truth about the $800.00, since the exhibit shows that 
the account may be drawn on only by his wife and him, 
and since he testified that they made all of the withdrawals 
themselves (Tr. 83). In any event the money was received 
and spent by appellant. With this added, his monthly in-
come averaged approximately $380.00 per month. The 
trial court considered this adequate for the increase, since 
no showing was made that it was inadequate. 
The testimony further shows that appellant's elder 
son has now attained his majority (Tr. 82) and so the 
appellant is thus relieved of the responsibility of support-
ing him. It also shows that his home is now paid for (Tr. 
85), although it was not at the time of the divorce decree 
(Tr. 86). 
Appellant offered absolutely no testimony which 
would indicate inability to pay the increase requested. This 
would seem to imply that his earnings are adequate for 
that purpose. Since May 28, 1948, no withdrawals were 
made from his savings account (Tr. 10). · 
Thus we see that appellant, who was unemployed April 
16, 1945, is now employed, earning $283.00-$380.00 per 
month, now has his house paid for, and is no longer re-
sponsible for the support of his other son. 
As to plaintiff-respondent's situation: 
The record shows she spent about $25.00 a month for 
the support of the minor child of the parties at the time 
the decree was granted (Tr. 17, 40). The court found that 
defendant could pay $25.00 a month (Finding of Fact 
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Number 11, in the original divorce action) for the support 
of the child and awarded that amount. 
Plaintiff now finds it necessary to spend an average of 
approximately $86.74 a month for the care of the child (Tr. 
21 through 27). There are two apparent causes of this. 
First, the child has grown from 15 months-still a babe in 
arms (Tr. 14, 16)-to five years, eight months at the time 
of the trial court's decision herein, in consequence of which 
he is much larger, more active and is about to enter school. 
Secondly, there has been a general inflation in the cost of 
the items necessary for the child. Both Mr. Taylor (Tr. 44, 
45, 46) and Mr. Pace (Tr. 57 through 65) supported this. 
The court is entitled to look beyond the evidence offered 
to show this inflation. The court may take judicial knowl-
edge of economic and social conditions, National Bank of 
the Republic vs. Beckstead, 68 Utah 421, 250 P. 1033, and 
matters of common knowledge, Little Cottonwood Water Co. 
vs. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116. 
Furthermore, under the provisions of Section 104-46-1, 
U. C. A. 1943: 
"In all these cases the court may resort for its 
aid to appropriate books or documents of reference." 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a sub-
stantial inflation occurred during the period in question. 
Appellant criticizes witness Taylor's testimony since he 
could not correlate the differences in cost of clothing for a 
15 month old child in 1945 as against a 5 year old child in 
1949. Such correlation is unnecessary. Where we know 
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that the cost of supporting the child has increased from two 
causes, i. e. because he now wears trousers instead of 
diapers, and the trousers now cost more than diapers and 
also more than trousers did in 1945, it is not necessary to 
decide how much of the additional cost was due to each 
factor since the total change in cost of caring for the child 
gives us the measure and the changes in circumstance 
furnish the reason. 
As far as the effect of the inflation on appellant's own 
financial condition, this makes no difference as long as ap-
pellant has adequate funds to support the child. 
3. FINDING OF FACT NO. 3 WAS SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE, FOR THE OBLIGATION TO SUP-
PORT THE CHILD RESTED UPON THE APPELLANT, 
AND ANY EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW THE RE-
SPONDENT'S INCOME WAS IRRELEVANT AND 
COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT; AND 
THE TESTIMONY WAS CLEAR THAT NO FUND HAD 
BEEN SET UP BY THE DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE 
FOR THE CHILD'S CARE NOR HAD ANY OTHER 
FUNDS BEEN PROVIDED ON BEHALF OF THE AP-
PELLANT FOR THE CARE OF THE CHILD. 
Appellant's objection to Finding of Fact number 3 
arises from a misconception of the law, which is clearly 
stated in the Holbrook case (supra, page 11). If the appel-
lant had set up a trust fund, an annuity, or by some other 
means provided for support for the child in addition to 
what the decree directed him to pay, that would constitute 
other "funds with which to support the child," and the 
t 
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husband would be entitled to credit therefore. But as long 
as the support of the child remains the responsibility of the 
father, and he is able to support the child, he is not en-
titled to credit for the mother's efforts. (Holbrook case, 
Supra, page 11.) 
4. THE TESTIMONY SHOWS THAT THE APPEL-
LANT'S INCOME WAS AMPLE FOR THE PAYMENT 
OF THE INCREASED ALLOWANCE, AND THERE 
WAS NO TESTIMONY WHICH IN ANY WAY CON-
TROVERTED THIS; THEREFORE, FINDING OF FACT 
NO. 4-A WAS CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
The original divorce decree was based on a finding that 
defendant-appellant was unemployed on April 16, 1945. 
He now tries to add additional meaning to that finding. 
This can not be done. The question is res judicata. (See dis-
cussion starting at page 12 above.) 
Nor can the fact that as an independent contractor he 
occasionally has some free time .be said as a matter of law 
to show that he is not "employed" now, since from the proof 
the court was entitled to infer that his average monthly 
earnings for the 7.8 month period prior to the trial were 
from $283.00 to $380.00 per month. This was not only a 
substantial income, but defendant made no effort to show 
that the cost of supporting himself and his wife was such 
that he would be in any way inconvenienced if required to 
pay the increased support money allowance. 
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5. THE TESTIMONY CLEARLY WARRANTED 
THE COURT'S GRANTING TO THE RESPONDENT AN 
ADDITIONAL AWARD TO COVER, THE COSTS FOR 
THE MINOR CHILD DURING THE EDUCATIONAL 
PERIOD. 
There is ample proof in the record to support an order 
of the Court raising the allowance to $50.00 a month without 
regard to the boy's entrance in school. The trial Court 
chose not to do this, but placed it at $35.00 a month till he 
started school. It would seem that the respondent, not the 
appellant, should be entitled to complain of this. However, 
we feel that the Court has judicial knowledge that after 
children start school they require more and better clothing, 
and we have not complained of this. If the appellant's 
argument on this point is recognized, we feel the order 
should be modified to allow respondent $50.00 per month 
from the date of the modification order rather than from 
the date of commencing school. 
6. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 4-C TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THE COST OF FOOD, EDUCATION AND CARE FOR 
THE CHILD HAD INCREASED. 
The record shows that respondent spent on the child 
before the original decree about $25.00 a month. She de-
tailed the present expenses fully (Tr. 21 through 27) and 
they average about $86.7 4 per month. They indicate that 
the various items for which expenditures must be made 
have increased in number and that the cost of the individual 
I~ 
I 
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items necessary has increased (Supra page 3). There is no 
testimony that the grandmother pays for the child's clothing, 
medical care, toys, or does more than provide food and tend 
the child. Furthermore, this $30 item alone is more than 
the allowance originally made the respondent, and more 
than respondent expended for the care of the child before 
the original decree. 
7. THE FINDING OF FACT NO. 5 INDICATING 
THE AMOUNTS NECESSARY FOR THE APPROPRI-
ATE CARE OF THE CHILD UNTIL AND AFTER IT 
ENTERS SCHOOL IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND IS A PROPER FINDING OF FACT 
BASED UPON THAT EVIDENCE. 
Appellant contends he lacks the means to pay the in-
crease. He analyzes (p. 18 Appellant's Brief) his income 
as amounting to only $212.50 per month. We have shown 
it is from $283.00 to $380.00 per month. Furthermore, no 
evidence was offered to show that his expenses were such 
as would make it at all difficult for him to pay the increase. 
Appellant also claims that the mother in this case 
should bear some of the responsibility for supporting the 
child, ch~.iming that the appellant is an "over-burdened 
father." There is no evidence of any such over burden on 
::::. the appellant as would invoke any such principle, and cer-
: ~ tainly the respondent will be bearing a good share of the 
:: cost any way. While appellant would be paying $35.00, 
:j; respondent would be paying $51.74 a month and when ap-
:~: pellant is paying $50.00, respondent will be paying $36.74 a 
if; month. 
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8. IT WAS PROPER FOR THE COURT TO GRANT 
RESPONDENT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPEL-
LANT FOR THE SUM OF $100.00 FOR REIMBURSE-
MENT FOR ANY ATTORNEY FEE IN THIS ACTION, 
EVEN THOUGH APPELLANT WAS NOT DELIN-
QUENT IN HIS PAYMENTS AT THE TIME OF THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION. 
This question is thoroughly dealt with in the Honorable 
Trial Judge's opinion. The appellant relies heavily on the 
Iowa cases, since the Iowa Statute is similar to Sec. 40-3-3, 
U. C. A., 1943. However, the Iowa Court has at ,all times 
refused to make any allowance of attorney fees after the 
decree becomes final, so it holds directly contrary to the 
rule announced by this court in the many adjudicated cases, 
where at the time modification was sought, the husband was 
delinquent in the payment of his support money. 
In Barish vs. Barish, 180 N. W. 724, decided by the 
Iowa Supreme Court in 1920, the Court states: 
"We hold that neither this nor any other statute 
gives this appellant any better claim to the taxation 
of an attorney fee than is given any litigant who 
seeks to make a money recovery without having a 
contract for the taxing of attorney fees." 
The court states with reference to his wife that "she 
is no longer the wife of the appellee." 
In Stone vs. Stone, 212 Ia. 1344, 235 N. W. 492, the 
husband sought the modification and the wife resisted it 
and it was denied and the Iowa Court held up even in this 
case the wife was not entitled to an attorney fee. 
.r: 
I· 
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As is pointed out by the trial judge's memorandum, 
the \Vashington cases cited by the appellant are not in point 
inasmuch as the \Vashington statute provides for the taxing 
of attorney fees only "pending the action for divorce." 
Washington has no such statute as our 40-3-5. 
In the Wisconsin case of Blake vs. Blake, 35 N. W. 551, 
there is no showing that defendant's husband was in arrears 
at the time the decree of modification was sought and yet the 
\Visconsin Supreme Court allowed an attorney fee to the 
wife. 
In Chambers vs. Chambers, 106 N. W. 993, the' 
Nebraska Supreme Court on similar facts, allowed an at-
torney fee to the wife. 
Counsel for respondent has been unable to find any 
case which draws a distinction in allowing an attorney fee 
to the wife in an action for modification between the situa-
tion where the h~sband is delinquent and where he is not 
delinquent. The learned Trial Judge in his memorandum 
points out that when the circumstances indicate that the 
support money allowance is no longer adequate, the mother 
is well justified in bringing an action and since this is done 
for the benefit of the child whose support is the responsi-
bility of the husband, then the husband, not the wife, should 
pay the attorney fees. 
The trial judge further points out that in cases like 
this, the husband has not been making an adequate pro-
vision for the support of the child and this action is brought 
to require that he make adequate provision. It would seem 
logical that it would be just as reasonable to require the 
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husband to pay the attorney fee where his failure to make 
adequate provision is due to the inadequacy of the support 
money allowance as where it is due to his failure to keep 
up the payments required by the court order. 
We further respectfully submit, that the award of the 
attorney fee is not made as a punishment in any of the Utah 
cases dealing with this situation. Rather, a change of cir-
cumstances has arisen creating a situation requiring further 
legal proceding in the divorce matter. The court has re-
tained jurisdiction of this matter under our statutes, and 
the change is made for the benefit of the child. Therefore, 
the fee, it would seem, is awarded for the benefit of the 
child. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits, that the pleadings and 
the proof were entirely adequate to support the Findings, 
Conclusions and Modification Order of the District Court. 
There is ample evidence of a need for the increase and ample 
evidence of the appellant's ability to pay it, but no evidence 
to show that it would work any hardship upon him. 
Furthermore, respondent contends that the Trial Court 
was justified under the law of this State in ordering the ap-
pellant to pay to the respondent her attorney fee. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted, that both on the 
facts and the law, the judgment of the lower court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN M. HATCH, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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